Abstract -Critical national infrastructures for power, emergency services, finance, and other basic industries rely heavily on information and telecommunications networks (voice, data, Internet) to provide services and conduct business. While these networks tend to be highly rehable, outages do occur which can have cascading effects to other infrastructures. This paper describes a dynamic simulation model of a power outage which cascades to impact telecom for services without power back-up, which cascades to impact emergency services 911 calling, which causes increased severity of injuries.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a collaboration across infrastructures and the System Dynamics simulator models to support that collaboration. The simulation models are implemented using Vensim [3] , which can be used for dynamic simulation of other industry infrastructures [1] . Previous efforts have included the N-SMART Voice [2] metro area PSTN discrete event, call-by-call, simulation model. This more detailed model drives the aggregated systems dynamics representations presented here in the higher level models across infrastructures. The critical national infrastructures are shown on Figure 1 . We have telecommunications depicted at the center since it is critical to all the others. Around the circle are critical infrastructures for power, transportation, water, agriculture, emergency services, and the others.
What's new here is that we are no longer taking a smokestack approach to industries, that is, each within their own perview. But rather, we are taking them in pairs to look at the cascading of impacts between industries.
In the next section we make this general discussion more specific. That is, we simulate three infrastructures (Power, Telecom, and Emergency Services) together in relation to a specific problem that might be encountered in the future. In particular, power blackouts may cause loss of telephone service for those without power back-up, which then impacts the ability of people to call 911 in emergency service situations. The resulting impact is that regular injuries become major injuries, and major injuries could become fatal. It is a fact that more and more people are moving to situations where their phones won't work in the event of a blackout. These situations include:
II. POWER, TELECOM AND EMERGENCY SERVICES
1. People with only cordless phones, which need power to operate.
2. People with wireless only service. It is estimated that about 4% of households in 2004 have wireless only service, i.e., no wireline service. This is expected to grow rapidly because of the economic incentive to do so. [4] 3. People with voice over cable telephony service. The cable modems need power to operate.
4. People with other VoIP arrangements where back-up power is not provided.
Where a telephone service has back-up power, we use the terminology "power lifeline". When it does not, we say "no power lifeline." It is possible for each of the above 4 categories to have power lifeline, but it is typically not provided.
As an example, category 2 on wireless only service is affected only after several hours of blackout. Cell towers typically depend on battery back-up (-4 hours). Hence, a power disruption (blackout) lasting longer than 4 hours would eliminate telephone service for all those "wireless only" access arrangements. Figure 3 shows a plot of a potential future for wireless only service. Figure 4 . The traffic profile reflects the time-of-day variation of the traffic over a 24 hour period. Communication networks are designed to handle peak busy hours, which corresponds to the part of the profile that is equal to 1. Busy hours on Figure 4 are 10:00 -12:00, and 16:00 -20:00. Outside of the busy hour, the traffic rate is scaled by the factor given by the profile. As can be seen from Figure 4 , the traffic rate becomes very small during night hours (only 10% of busy hour). The result of all this is a telecom efficiency function on the right side of Figure 7 , explained next.
A. Network Telecom Efficiency under Blackout scenario
Combining the simple blackout model with the forecast of lines throughout the area that are impacted by a power blackout, we get a network telecom efficiency function, which is really a service availability index of customers able to make telephone calls. The blue dashed line on Figure 8 is the baseline, that is, telecom efficiency = 100% for the whole period. Everyone is able to make telephone calls. The red solid line on Figure 8 is the blackout scenario starting at hour 4 and lasting until hour 42. The blackout starts at hour 4 with a slight dip in telecom efficiency for those wireline only customers without power lifeline. Then it dips significantly at hour 8 after all the cell towers run out of back-up power. We modeled this as an instantaneous drop. In reality, it would be spread out over a few hours as different cell towers blackout because their battery reserves run down. Note that batteries run down as a function of the amount of calling load. So, if there is a spike in demand for cell usage, the cell towers may last significantly less than 4 hours on their battery reserve.
This telecom efficiency function over time will be input into the emergency services model discussed next.
V. EMERGENCY SERVICES MODEL
Emergency Services consist of police, fire, and medical emergency services. While we could break these down into three buckets and deal with each separately, here we simply bundle them together since they are all accessed by calling 911 in an emergency [6] .
Some telecom 911 Facts are included in [7] . In addition, about 2.4 million people (-6,000 per day) die each year. Deaths by cause and death rates are shown in Table 2 . These statistics represent our baseline conditions when the telecom efficiency index is at 100%. All of the following tables are from [7] . 
C. Assumed Costs for injuries and non-injury related illnesses
The information in Table 4 are the assumed Economic costs we use in our study developed from information in the previous tables. The injury related cost come from Table 3 with the cost per regular injury the average of nonincapacitating evident injury and possible injury. The right side of Table 4 represents the assumed costs for all those causes of illness (e.g., heart attacks) that are not injury related (see Table 2 ). Since there was no data on these costs, we assumed they were 25% of the injury related costs. Figure 9 represents the emergency services Vensim model starting on the left with the telecom efficiency function developed previously in Figure 7 and Figure 8 . It starts on the left with the level of 911 calls (i.e., 0.4 calls per second or 120 calls every 5 minutes). This is approximately consistent with the 34,000 calls per day to 911 assumed to be evenly distributed over the 24 hours in a day.
We then divide the calls up into those that get through and those that don't as a function of the telecom efficiency. We next separate out the non-emergencies (66.67%), and then divide the calls into 7 buckets as follows:
* no injunes * regular injury and regular non-injury illnesses * major injury and major non-injury illnesses * fatal injury and fatal non-injury illnesses (death)
The split between injuries and non-injury illnesses (heart attacks, asthma attacks, etc.) is represented by the factor "injury related %". This factor is estimated at 35.5% [7] because * In 2002 in the USA, there were 38.9 emergency room visits per 100 persons * Of those 13.8 or 35.5% of those visits were injury related. The response time to 911 calls in the USA is amazingly fast for those emergency calls that require dispatch. Note that the non-emergency calls don't require dispatch. The response time is tracked for every call, and a measure of effectiveness is the average response time. A typical example is given by Pinellas County, Florida where it is approximately 5 minutes which is the time from receipt of call to dispatch plus the time to arrive at the scene of the emergency [9] . This is the baseline scenario where all 911 calls are completed through the telecom network. Now all these calls result in either no injury or non-injury illness, regular injury or regular non-injury illness, major injury or major non-injury illness or fatal injury or fatal non-injury illness. The no injury or non-injury illness category is assumed to include all the non-emergency calls (66.6% of all calls). Regular injuries or regular non-injury illness occurs in 70% of the calls, major injuries or major non-injury illness occurs in 29.8% of the calls, and fatal injuries or fatal noninjury illnesses occur in 0.2% of the calls. The major injuries and major non-injury illness (29.8%) and the fatal injury and fatal non-injury illness (0.2%) are approximately consistent with the injury and death facts presently previously.
The blackout scenario forces us to ask the question: What if the potential 911 caller can't get through because their phone is dead? Hence, there can be no emergency service response. We postulate what would happen in Figure 10 . We would have changes in the level of injury.
* No injuries category would remain the same * Most regular injuries remain regular injuries, but some regular injuries would become major injuries * Most major injuries remain major injuries but some major injuries become worse and even fatal (death) The level of changes to these categories is subject to speculation. In what follows, we have assumed that the fraction of overall regular injuries would go down (to say 44% from 70% in the baseline), since many of those injuries would become major injuries. Major injuries would increase (to 55.6% from 29.8% in the baseline) of the total, and fatal injuries would increase as well (to 0.4% from 0.2% in the baseline) since some of those major injuries would result in fatality. These transition levels require further investigation and drive the results presented next.
We further assume that the same process would work for non-injury related illnesses. They would become more serious or fatal if there was no 911 response.
VII. SUMMARY RESULTS -INJURIES AND COST
Combining all of the previous models, the results below show a comparison between the baseline model where telecom and 911 calling is working fine, and the blackout scenario where a significant fraction of the population can't call 911. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the changes in injury levels and non-injury levels. 6,000 4,000 -2,000 regular non-nmjor non-non-injury injury injury death Figure 13 shows the overall cost results by multiplying the injuries and non-injuries by the cost per injury and cost per non-injury. While the regular injury and non-injury cost goes down somewhat because there are less regular injuries and non-injuries, the major injury and non-injury costs goes up since there is many more of them. In addition, the fatal injury and non-injury (death) category also shows an increase.
$250,000,000 $200,000,000 $150,000,000 __-. $100,000,000 $50,000,000 no injury regular injury and major injury and death from injury non-injury noninjury and non-injury The summary costs for each of the scenarios are shown in In both of these we assumed there was no simultaneous infrastructure disruption to the telecom network, except for that caused by lack of power. In this sensitivity study, we add a telecom disruption to the whole network lasting from 8 AM to 10 PM of day 1 of our two day period, knocking out 75% of the network capacity.
The additional scenario with both blackout and telecom disruption reduces the overall telecom efficiency to very low levels during the periods of blackout and telecom disruption. Hence very few 911 calls get through during this period. This results in more major injuries and major noninjury and more fatal injury and non-injuries. Table 6 shows the summary costs. The costs are increased to $63M Figure 12 -Number of non-injuries over baseline, almost double that of the blackout only scenario. 
